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 Significant advances in cryogenic technology render it possible 
to freeze and store human gametes. Under appropriate 
laboratory conditions frozen gametes can remain viable for long 
periods of time. In consequence, it is possible for a child to be 
conceived and procreated after the death of one or both parents. 
This raises some challenging juristic problems. Amongst these 
are implications for the law of inheritance. Where a valid will 
expressly refers to a child who will be procreated after the 
testator's death, the child's right to inherit will be secured. 
However, where a will merely refers to children as a class, or 
with intestate succession, it becomes uncertain whether a 
posthumously procreated child has a right to inherit. South 
African legislation governing succession, the common law and 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 all fail to 
provide definitive answers. Because of this and as the numbers 
of posthumously procreated children are likely to increase as 
artificial reproduction services become more widely available, 
there is a need for South African legislation to clarify their 
inheritance rights.  
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1 Introduction 
In this article we discuss some issues arising from developing medical 
capabilities in assisted human reproductive technology. We focus on 
inheritance rights for children posthumously procreated by implantation in a 
female's womb after the death of at least one parent.1 For convenience, we 
use the concept of posthumous procreation narrowly to refer only to such 
children, and not to children born after a testator's death subsequent to 
natural conception.2 Post-mortem artificial conception and implantation are 
possible as a result of artificial reproductive technologies involving in vitro 
fertilisation (IVF) and cryogenics. Where a valid will deals expressly with the 
possibility of a posthumously implanted heir, apportionment of a deceased 
person's estate is unlikely to be problematic.3 However, where, as is 
frequently the case, wills merely refer generally to classes of beneficiaries 
such as descendants or surviving children, the question of whether a such 
child is to be included becomes more difficult. Whether such a child should 
have a claim is also pertinent for the law of intestate succession. 
Zago noted that failures by legislatures in many jurisdictions to keep the law 
abreast of advancing medical technology in the field of artificial procreation 
creates a group of "second-class children" arbitrarily denied inheritance 
rights.4 In this article our primary aim is to evaluate existing South African 
law with a view to establishing the extent to which it provides guidance 
concerning such rights. We establish a context in part 2 with some 
explanatory notes on relevant aspects of artificial procreation techniques 
and possibilities. In part 3 we discuss the South African succession 
legislation and show that it provides inadequate coverage on inheritance 
rights for beneficiaries procreated after the death of testators. In part 4 the 
extent to which South African common law provides answers is explored. 
We again conclude that it provides insufficient guidance for potential 
claimants. In part 5 we investigate whether the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution) provides adequate direction. Yet 
again, our conclusion is negative. Finally, in the light of our analysis, we 
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1  Implantation and related artificial reproductive processes are explained in part 2 
below. 
2  We clarify our use of terminology further in part 2 below. 
3  This is discussed further in part 3 below. 
4  Zago 2014 http://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/609. 
J d'ALMAINE & FN ZAAL PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  3 
suggest in our concluding part 6 that in order to protect children legislation 
is urgently needed to address the ambiguities and lacunae in the law.  
2  Artificial reproduction techniques 
In vitro fertilisation is well established for assisting infertile couples to have 
children. It involves the retrieval of eggs from the ovary of a female. These 
are combined with the sperm of a male donor and cultured in a laboratory.5 
An embryo is formed by mingling chromosomes from the cells of the two 
parents. This occurs 22 to 30 hours after penetration of the ovum by 
spermatozoa. A resulting fertilised ovum, or egg, of the female parent may 
then be referred to as an embryo, or zygote.6 Once formed, an embryo can 
be implanted in the womb of a female and this may be followed by 
pregnancy and birth.7 
It has become possible to delay the process of IVF. Cryogenics has been 
described as the science of freezing, subsequently thawing and then 
regenerating body parts.8 Since the late 1970s medical technicians have 
been able to freeze semen and eggs prior to combining them for fertilisation. 
After fertilisation, embryos can also be kept frozen prior to implantation.9 
Viability can be retained for many years, provided the correct frozen 
conditions are maintained. Embryos may later be thawed and implanted in 
a female's uterus. Where this is done successfully, the cells continue to 
divide and develop until the mother gives birth.10 A significant consequence 
of the potential for long-term freezing is that procreation can occur long after 
the death of gamete donors.11 If an egg is fertilised by semen only after the 
death of a parent, a resulting child has been conceived post-mortem. 
Alternatively, if a frozen embryo was already available but is utilised after 
the death of a parent, only implantation in a female's womb occurs post-
                                            
5  A couple might obtain gametes from an unknown donor. This may raise a question 
of who the lawful parents of a resulting child are. Generally, a married couple having 
consented or a mother giving birth to the child can result in designations of lawful 
parentage in terms of s 40 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005. For a detailed analysis 
of parental relationships covered by this section see Schäfer Child Law in South 
Africa 30-32. 
6  This zygote subsequently divides into two cells after 24 to 36 hours, then four cells 
after 40 to 50 hours. Finally, from approximately 50 to 78 hours after insemination 
the zygote develops into a cluster of about 8 cells. See Human Fertilization 
Embryology Authority 2014 http://www.hfea.gov.uk/IVF.html. 
7  Human Fertilization Embryology Authority 2014 http://www.hfea.gov.uk/IVF.html. 
8  Diamond 1998 NY Int'l L Rev 78. 
9  Diamond 1998 NY Int'l L Rev 78. 
10  Human Fertilization Embryology Authority 2014 http://www.hfea.gov.uk/IVF.html. 
11  Shayne 2015 https://www.hklaw.com/privatewealthblog/benefits-due-a-child 28-29. 
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mortem. It should be noted that for the purposes of our analysis we use the 
terminology "posthumous procreation" to refer to children in both these 
categories. However, we do not include children who were either naturally 
conceived or artificially implanted in a mother's womb prior to the death of 
a testator, even if they were born afterwards. 
It is even possible to remove and then freeze semen, and more recently 
female eggs, from the body of a donor who is recently deceased.12 Adding 
to a need for appropriate legal solutions is the fact that the number of 
instances of the long-term freezing and storage of gametes is increasing 
internationally. Women wishing to delay childbearing in order to pursue 
career goals and persons of both sexes expecting to undergo dangerous 
military service, chemotherapy or other medical treatments which may 
reduce their fertility are often motivated to resort to cryopreservation of their 
gametes.13 It is thus becoming increasingly common for persons at risk of 
death or infertility to decide to preserve their gametes for possible future 
procreation.14 A surviving partner may subsequently seek to conceive a 
child as a genetic reminder or to fulfil the wishes of the deceased parent.15 
Another factor increasing the utilisation of artificial procreation techniques is 
that costs are gradually diminishing as artificial reproduction services 
become more widely available and streamlined.16 Amongst the 
consequences are the increasing numbers of posthumously procreated 
children.  
The possibilities of artificially procreating children after the death of one or 
both parents and the increasing utilisation of relevant medical technology 
raise difficult questions such as whether or when rights of inheritance should 
be accorded.17 It is only a matter of time before South African courts are 
                                            
12  Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine 2013 Fertil 
Steril 1842; Bard and Penrose 2015 Health Matrix 229. 
13  Diamond 1998 NY Int'l L Rev 80-81; Shayne 2015 https://www.hklaw.com/private 
wealthblog/benefits-due-a-child 1. 
14  Doucet 2013 Dalhousie J Legal Stud 2-3; Croucher 2017 Trusts and Trustees 67-
68. 
15  Alberta Law Reform Institute Succession and Posthumously Conceived Children 
para 15. 
16  Doucet 2013 Dalhousie J Legal Stud 1-2. 
17  Other issues not dealt with in this article include whether frozen gametes or embryos 
can be inherited; which of two separating spouses or partners can decide whether 
to utilise them; and when they must be preserved or destroyed. See, for example, 
Heaton South African Law of Persons 12 fn 51, where it is suggested that the 
maximum preservation time for frozen embryos should be four years. For a South 
African analysis of related divorce disputes see generally Moodley Comparative 
Analysis. Concerning citizenship rights for after-born children, see Alberta Law 
Reform Institute Succession and Posthumously Conceived Children para 19. 
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called upon to resolve such disputes. It is therefore pertinent to evaluate the 
extent to which existing South African legislation and common law provide 
relevant coverage. 
3 Succession legislation 
Anyone seeking guidance on inheritance rights for posthumously 
procreated children might understandably first turn to a consideration of 
legislation designed specifically to cover inheritance claims. Intestate 
succession is governed by the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987. 
Unfortunately, this does not provide any specific wording which could be 
interpreted as guiding inheritance claims by posthumously procreated child 
beneficiaries. Whether there are any circumstances in which such 
beneficiaries would be covered by this Act thus remains uncertain.  
Where a testator has left a valid will, the Wills Act 7 of 1953 (Wills Act) 
becomes applicable. Since the primary purpose of this Act is to enable 
inheritances to be distributed in accordance with the wishes of testators, it 
is a good idea for anyone who freezes their gametes for possible future 
procreation to draft a will including clear instructions about inheritance 
shares for possible posthumous descendants.18 Where a will which is valid 
in terms of the Wills Act clearly provides for inheritance by a posthumously 
procreated child, such a child will be eligible for a share as indicated in the 
will. However, in the common situation where a will merely refers to 
unnamed children or issue as a broad category of beneficiaries, the position 
becomes less clear.  
Section 2D(1)(c), as inserted into the Wills Act in 1992, deals specifically 
with broad category beneficiary designations.19 It reads:  
In the interpretation of a will, unless the context otherwise indicates -…. (c) 
any benefit allocated to the children of a person, or to the members of a class 
of persons, mentioned in the will shall vest in the children of that person or 
those members of the class of persons who are alive at the time of the 
devolution of the benefit, or who have already been conceived at that time and 
who are later born alive. 
As can be seen, this creates a presumption that benefits in a will due to 
children as a class, including distantly related children such as 
grandchildren, must be interpreted as extending to children conceived by 
the time of death of the testator and subsequently born alive unless there is 
                                            
18  On suggested wording see Gary 2005 https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/publishing/probate_property_magazine 38. 
19  Added by s 4 of the Law of Succession Amendment Act 43 of 1992.  
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evidence in the will of a contrary intention. A key requirement is clearly that 
children must have "already been conceived" at the time of the testator's 
death. What constitutes conception is not defined in the Act and so the 
drafters may have considered only the possibility of unassisted natural 
conception. A question which therefore arises is whether the conception 
requirement in section 2D(1)(c) can be met by posthumously procreated 
children. As noted in part 2 above, two distinctly different situations are 
possible: those in which a fertilised embryo already exists at the time of the 
testator's death and those in which male and female gametes have not yet 
been conjoined. If a court were to treat implantation in the mother's womb 
as analogous to natural conception, both categories of posthumous children 
would be excluded. On the other hand, if fertilisation were treated as 
analogous, the embryo category of posthumously conceived children could 
then benefit from section 2D(1)(c), provided a live birth subsequently 
occurred. In our submission fertilisation rather than implantation should be 
treated as equivalent to natural conception. This would be in accordance 
with the approach taken by modern medical scholars,20 and could enable at 
least one category of posthumously procreated children to benefit from 
inheritances. However, it must be conceded that it is not possible to interpret 
section 2D(1)(c) to cover situations where male and female gametes were 
conjoined only after the death of a testator. This is because it cannot be 
claimed in such cases that conception occurred in time. 
In conclusion, the current South African legislation covering intestate 
succession contains no relevant wording and thus offers no basis for claims 
by posthumously procreated children. That governing testate succession 
also provides no direct coverage. However, depending on how the 
conception requirement in section 2D(1)(c) of the Wills Act is interpreted, 
some posthumously procreated children could potentially benefit. Where 
gametes have not yet been conjoined, the section provides no basis for a 
claim. 
4 The common law  
With succession legislation providing little clarity and limited scope for 
claims, it may be considered whether the common law makes up for this by 
providing some direction on whether or when posthumously procreated 
children should be able to inherit. Arguably, courts might interpret the law in 
favour of some claims either by utilising their powers as upper guardians of 
                                            
20  See, for example, Peters 2006 UC Davis L Rev 202; Okohue et al 2009 Afr J Reprod 
Health 119; and Walmsley 2014 Obstet Gynaecol Forum 30. 
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all minors or by extending the nasciturus doctrine. Each of these possibilities 
will be considered separately. 
Where there is no valid will, or a valid will refers only broadly to children as 
a class of beneficiaries, it is possible that a court could utilise its common 
law power as the upper guardian of all minors to support an interpretation 
in favour of an inheritance for a posthumously procreated child. As a 
rationale, the upper guardianship power enables an argument based on 
necessity. Need becomes a ground for the provision of support to any 
category of a vulnerable child. Peart contends that in common law 
jurisdictions there is no reason why this should not include a posthumously 
procreated child on whose behalf a succession claim has been brought.21 
However, it is not clear whether a South African court would be willing to 
extend the parens patriae function to cover the pre-birth circumstances of 
posthumously procreated children, because in South African law legal 
personality is bestowed only at birth.22 The applicability of the upper 
guardianship power is thus uncertain. 
As an alternative, the nasciturus doctrine has the advantage that it has 
developed specifically to take into account pre-birth circumstances. The 
principle nasciturus pro iam nato habetur, quotiens de commodo eius agitur 
evolved in Roman law.23 In terms of this principle foetuses could be treated 
as already born if this was to their benefit.24 It is notable that in Roman times 
the principle was applied in cases of succession.25 In South African law the 
principle was received as the nasciturus doctrine. It has sometimes been 
regarded as a rule and sometimes as a mere fiction. Under the fiction, legal 
subjectivity begins only at birth, and benefits are kept open until birth.26 The 
nasciturus rule, on the other hand, deems legal subjectivity to begin at 
conception if there is a benefit which would accrue to the foetus once it is 
born. This means that a foetus may receive rights prior to its birth.27 Both 
the fiction and the rule require that a foetus must be born alive. Aside from 
birth, there are two other requirements. Firstly, the application of the 
doctrine must be beneficial to the foetus. Secondly, the conception of the 
foetus must have occurred before such a benefit accrued.28  
                                            
21  Peart 2015 VU W L Rev 735. 
22  Pillay 2010 Stell LR 232. Also see Pickles 2013 Stell LR 148. 
23  See Justinian Digest 1.5.7, 1.5.26, 5.4.3. 
24  Johnston 1997 CLJ 90. 
25  Johnston 1997 CLJ 85; Boezaart "Child Law" 6. 
26  Boezaart "Child Law" 6. 
27  Boezaart "Child Law" 8. 
28  Boezaart "Child Law" 6. 
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It is important to note that the application of the doctrine has gradually been 
extended in some well-known South African leading cases. In Chisholm v 
East Rand Property Mines Ltd it was held that where a girl's father had been 
killed before her birth as a result of another's delict, she was entitled to a 
dependant's action for loss of support. 29 In Shields v Shields divorcing 
parents wished to include in their divorce order a condition that the father 
would not pay maintenance for a pregnant mother's child after its birth.30 
Although it did not expressly mention the nasciturus doctrine, the court 
protected the unborn child by denying the request.31 In Ex Parte Boedel 
Steenkamp a testator bequeathed his estate to his daughter and her 
children alive at the time of his death.32 The court held that the pregnant 
daughter's foetus should be presumed to be alive so as to inherit equally 
with its mother and siblings.33 This ruling has since been regularly followed 
in South Africa and is incorporated in section 2D(1)(c) of the Wills Act as 
discussed above.34  
In Pinchin v Santam Insurance a pregnant woman was injured due to the 
negligence of a motor vehicle driver.35 When her baby was four months old, 
he was diagnosed with cerebral palsy and brain damage, and an action for 
delictual compensation was brought against the driver. Although evidence 
of the cause of the harm was found to be insufficient the court was in 
principle willing to apply the nasciturus doctrine, had the evidence been 
more conclusive.36 In Christian League of Southern Africa v Rall the court 
refused to extend the nasciturus doctrine so far as to protect against 
abortion.37  
These cases are important in showing that the nasciturus doctrine has 
gradually evolved in South African common law. While its application began 
with a dependency claim, it has been extended to paternal maintenance, 
succession and delict, but not to the prevention of abortion. Careful analysis 
will be required to decide whether the doctrine should be extended further 
as new issues arise. Clearly, assisted reproduction and cryogenics would 
not have been envisaged by the Roman jurists who originally formulated it. 
                                            
29  Chisholm v East Rand Property Mines Ltd. 1909 TH 297. 
30  Shields v Shields 1946 CPD 242. 
31  Boezaart "Child Law" 8 fn 27 shows that other remedies besides the doctrine can be 
applied in maintenance requests. 
32  Ex Parte Boedel Steenkamp 1962 3 SA 954 (O). 
33  Ex Parte Boedel Steenkamp 1962 3 SA 954 (O) 958. For a discussion of the court's 
reasoning, see Boezaart "Child Law" 7. 
34  Boezaart "Child Law" 7. 
35  Pinchin v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1963 2 SA 254 (W). 
36  Pinchin v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1963 2 SA 254 (W) 260. 
37  Christian League of Southern Africa v Rall 1981 2 SA 821 (OPA). 
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However, the reported South African cases do show that there is a potential 
for ongoing interpretation to serve the needs of the present, including in the 
field of succession. This needs to be kept in mind in considering whether 
posthumously procreated children should be included in the doctrine. 
As has been noted, a primary requirement is that an unborn child must stand 
to gain from the application of the nasciturus doctrine. As succession rights 
generally result in benefits, this requirement would likely be met where a 
posthumously procreated child seeks to inherit. The second requirement is 
that the benefit must accrue to the nasciturus after conception. This again 
raises the question of whether conception occurs when an embryo is 
fertilised or only when implantation into a female's womb subsequently 
occurs. In 1997, referring generally to in vitro fertilisation, Lupton submitted 
that the nasciturus doctrine should only be applied to benefit embryos 
already implanted into the womb of any intended mother.38 However, as 
pointed out in part 3 above, in the present century legal and medical 
scholars, when referring to assisted reproduction, have tended to view 
conception as occurring when male sperm is used to fertilise a female egg 
before implantation.  
Treating conception as occurring at fertilisation when sperm and an egg are 
conjoined replicates more closely the time of conception in unassisted 
natural procreation. Delaying conception by treating it as occurring only at 
implantation as proposed by Lupton could disadvantage many children. As 
explained in part 2 above, it is now possible to preserve gametes and 
embryos for many years before implantation. Thus, under Lupton's 
interpretation the legal moment of conception could be delayed and benefits 
lost in the meantime. It is therefore submitted that for the purposes of the 
nasciturus doctrine the moment of conception should be upon the 
completion of fertilisation.39 This would mean that the traditional 
requirement that conception needs to occur before a benefit accrues would 
more frequently be met. However, under this approach there is still the same 
difficulty as with section 2D(1)(c) of the Wills Act. If gametes are conjoined 
only after a parent dies, this means that conception would have occurred 
after a benefit such as an inheritance accrued. A court might therefore well 
hold that the doctrine is inapplicable. In relation to the third requirement of 
the nasciturus doctrine, that the child must subsequently be born alive, there 
are no particular difficulties with posthumously procreated children. The 
                                            
38  Lupton 1997 TSAR 746. Also see Heaton South African Law of Persons 12. 
39  Peters 2006 UC Davis L Rev 199 points out that fertilisation during natural or artificial 
conception occurs over about 48 hours, rather than instantaneously. 
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usual well-established South African legal requirements would apply. There 
must be complete separation from the mother's body and the foetus must 
have lived independently.40  
In favour of the application of the nasciturus doctrine to posthumously 
procreated children is that the reason for its existence over many centuries 
has been to provide for children not yet born at the time that a benefit 
accrues. Its extension to posthumously procreated children would therefore 
be a logical step forward. In Re Estate of the Late K and Re the 
Administration and Probate Act 1935: Ex Parte the Public Trustee (the K 
case) the Tasmanian Supreme Court had to decide whether a 
posthumously procreated child could inherit from a father who predeceased 
it.41 Shortly after the father's death an embryo fertilised with his sperm was 
implanted in his ex-wife's womb and a child was subsequently born. In 
considering whether to extend a legal fiction in favour of a frozen embryo 
not yet implanted at the time of a father's death, the court, per Slicer J, 
queried whether:  
[a]s a matter of policy, should the law distinguish between a child, en ventre 
sa mere, and his or her sibling who was at the same time a frozen embryo? 
Should a right by way of the application of a legal fiction be denied because 
medicine and technology have overtaken the circumstances extant in the 19th 
century when the legal fiction was applied?42 
Slicer J decided to extend the fiction and grant the inheritance because it 
would be illogical to presume that a testator would have wanted to include 
his child already in the mother's womb at the time of his death but not his 
child subsequently conceived by the same mother.43 
In keeping with the gradual expansion of the doctrine in South African law, 
and given its inherent flexibility, it would be possible to interpret the 
nasciturus doctrine just as Slicer J did in the K case. In order to achieve this, 
the time of conception would have to be regarded as the time of fertilisation, 
as suggested above. However, where it becomes much more difficult to 
apply the nasciturus doctrine is when fertilisation occurs only after the death 
of the testator. The doctrine provides no basis for withholding disbursement 
of an estate pending the possible conception of a child. Just as with the 
Wills Act, this leads to a technical distinction between frozen embryos in 
                                            
40  Pickles 2013 Stell LR 147. Any sign of life is sufficient to prove this. See Boezaart 
"Child Law" 6. 
41  Re Estate of the Late K and Re the Administration and Probate Act 1935: Ex Parte 
the Public Trustee 1996 TASSC 24 (22 April 1996) (the K case). 
42  The K case para 20. 
43  The K case para 29. 
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existence at the time of the death of the testator, and where frozen sperm 
and eggs have not yet been conjoined. The nasciturus doctrine provides no 
basis for inheritance in the latter situation. 
5 Applicability of the Constitution 
Given the limitations and uncertainties in both South African succession 
legislation and the common law, it is necessary to consider whether the 
Constitution provides guidance concerning inheritance claims by 
posthumously procreated children. With the Constitution, arguments of 
status, equality and the best interests of a child might all potentially be 
advanced in support of such claims. The scope for contentions based on 
each of these will be examined in turn. 
5.1 The legal status of an unborn child 
A primary question concerns children's pre-birth legal status or, more 
specifically, what constitutional rights can accrue prior to birth, if any. This 
needs to be evaluated in the light of the constitutional values and principles. 
As has been noted, in South African common law legal subjectivity is 
conferred upon a natural person only at birth,44 and a foetus is therefore not 
a legal subject and consequently has no rights in law.45 The question 
whether this common law position was altered by the Constitution arose in 
Christian Lawyers Association of SA v Minister of Health (the Christian 
Lawyers case).46 This case involved an attempt to prevent a woman from 
terminating her pregnancy in terms of the Choice on Termination of 
Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996. The plaintiff sought to have this Act declared 
unconstitutional in the light of section 11 of the Constitution, which states 
that "everyone has the right to life". The plaintiff contended that this wording 
entails that a foetus has the right to life from the moment of conception. The 
defendants raised an exception that there was no cause of action as a 
foetus has no legal status and therefore no constitutional rights. The court 
had to decide whether the plaintiff was correct in contending that "everyone" 
in section 11 must include a foetus from the moment of conception.47 The 
court noted that the Constitution did not contain any provisions expressly 
granting legal personality or protection to a foetus.48 It recognised that 
section 12(2) of the Constitution grants everyone the right to make decisions 
                                            
44  Heaton South African Law of Persons 7. 
45  Heaton South African Law of Persons 5. 
46  Christian Lawyers Association of SA v Minister of Health 1998 4 SA 1113 (T) (the 
Christian Lawyers case). 
47  The Christian Lawyers case 1117. 
48  The Christian Lawyers case 1120-1121. 
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regarding reproduction, but did not view this as according protection to a 
foetus.49  
Subsequently, in H v Kingsbury Foetal Assessment Centre the High Court 
once again refused to provide pre-birth protection.50 Here a mother 
unsuccessfully claimed damages from a foetal assessment centre, 
asserting that if she had been informed by them of the abnormality of her 
foetus, she would have aborted her pregnancy. The court refused her claim 
on the grounds that it could not decide whether it is better to have no life or 
to live with disabilities.51 In reaching this conclusion it relied on Stewart v 
Botha.52 However, when the mother appealed to the Constitutional Court, 
the latter was critical of the Stewart decision as not taking sufficient account 
of the paramountcy of the best interests of the child in terms of section 28 
of the Constitution.53 Whilst the Constitutional Court did not reach a specific 
determination and referred the matter back to the High Court, it seemed to 
imply that what happens to children prior to birth can be relevant to claims 
on their behalf.54 Whilst the Constitutional Court thus seemingly opened the 
door to claims based on pre-birth occurrences, there has so far been no 
reported case expressly affording constitutional rights to an unborn child.55 
In view of this, it is necessary to consider whether post-birth equality 
arguments may be relevant to posthumously procreated children. 
5.2  The right to equality 
It is trite that in South African law a child once born alive becomes a holder 
of constitutional rights. Included amongst these is the right to equality. This 
is conferred by section 9 of the Constitution, which gives everyone the equal 
protection and benefit of the law. What needs to be considered is whether 
a child's right to equality is violated if he or she is prevented from inheriting, 
due to having been implanted in a mother's womb after the death of the 
other parent. Answering this question requires discussion of the right to 
equality and the well-established test to determine whether there has been 
unfair discrimination. These will now be considered with particular reference 
to posthumously procreated children. 
                                            
49  The Christian Lawyers case 1121. 
50  H v Kingsbury Foetal Assessment Centre (Pty) Ltd 2014 ZAWCHC 61 (24 April 
2014). 
51  H v Kingsbury Foetal Assessment Centre (Pty) Ltd 2014 ZAWCHC 61 (24 April 2014) 
paras 20, 29. 
52  Stewart v Botha 2008 6 SA 310 (SCA). 
53  H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 2 SA 193 (CC) para 52. 
54  H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 2 SA 193 (CC) para 52. 
55  Smit 2015 De Rebus 42. 
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An initial consideration is that as a reaction to the long history of severe and 
systematic discrimination in South Africa the principle of equality was 
established as foundational in the Constitution. Albertyn and Goldblatt 
rightly characterise it as the first and foremost of constitutional rights.56 
Section 1(a) of the Constitution states: "The Republic of South Africa is … 
founded on the following values: (a) Human dignity, the achievement of 
equality, and the advancement of human rights and freedoms." This 
indicates that, as with any constitutional rights, the right to equality should 
be interpreted keeping in mind other constitutional values and also the 
interests that the right is meant to protect.57 In President of the Republic of 
South Africa v Hugo (the Hugo case) the Constitutional Court emphasised 
the close relationship between the value of dignity and the principle of 
equality.58 Goldstone J stated: 
At the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination lies a recognition that the 
purpose of our new constitutional and democratic order is the establishment 
of a society in which all human beings will be accorded equal dignity and 
respect regardless of their membership of particular groups. The achievement 
of such a society in the context of our deeply inegalitarian past will not be 
easy, but that that is the goal of the Constitution should not be forgotten or 
overlooked.59 
As pointed out by Deane, the theme of an "open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom runs like a golden thread 
through the Constitution."60 
On the connection between equality and dignity in the Bill of Rights Albertyn 
and Goldblatt noted that: 
[r]ead across a series of cases … the purpose of the equality right can be seen 
to promote a society where each person is accorded equal moral worth. The 
value of dignity … has sometimes widened to include issues of … material 
wellbeing.61  
                                            
56  Albertyn and Goldblatt 2006 http://www.chr.up.ac.za/chr_old/closa/chapters/Confer 
ence_Paper_on_the_Right_to_Equality.pdf 5. 
57  See Albertyn and Goldblatt 2006 http://www.chr.up.ac.za/chr_old/closa/chapters/ 
Conference_Paper_on_the_Right_to_Equality.pdf 5. 
58  President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC) (the Hugo case). 
59  The Hugo case para 41. 
60  Deane 2009 http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/2012/10chapter9.pdf 
284. 
61  Albertyn and Goldblatt 2006 http://www.chr.up.ac.za/chr_old/closa/chapters/ 
Conference_Paper_on_the_Right_to_Equality.pdf 5. 
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Inheritance rights for posthumously procreated children clearly relate to their 
material wellbeing. It is therefore arguable that the value of dignity can be 
applied for the protection of such rights. 
Section 9 of the Constitution describes the right to equality in detail as 
follows: 
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection 
and benefit of the law. 
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and 
freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and 
other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or 
categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be 
taken.  
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against 
anyone on one or more of the following grounds, including race, 
gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, 
language and birth. 
(4) No person may discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on 
one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). 
There were three foundational reported cases interpreting the right of 
equality as originally formulated in section 8 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993.62 These are Prinsloo v Van der 
Linde (the Prinsloo case),63 the Hugo case and Harksen v Lane (the 
Harksen case), which established a test to determine breaches of the 
right.64 Section 8 differs somewhat from section 9 of the final Constitution. 
However, Ackerman J, in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v 
Minister of Justice, concluded that: 
[t]he equality jurisprudence and analysis developed by this Court in relation to 
section 8 of the interim Constitution is applicable equally to section 9 of the 
1996 Constitution, notwithstanding certain differences in the wording.65 
Therefore, the section 8 cases remain relevant. 
In the Prinsloo case it was held that section 8 distinguishes between lawful 
and unlawful levels of discrimination.66 Some differentiation, as long as it 
                                            
62  Also referred to as the Interim Constitution. 
63  Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 3 SA 1012 (CC) (the Prinsloo case). 
64  Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) (the Harksen case) para 53. 
65  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2 
SA 1 (CC) para 15. 
66  The Prinsloo case paras 23, 25-26. 
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does not amount to unfair discrimination, is necessary in society. It will be 
lawful provided it is rational, non-arbitrary, and does not manifest "naked 
preferences".67 There must be a rational connection between the 
differentiation and its purpose. In particular, section 8(2) usefully set out 
grounds on which discrimination was presumed unfair, and other 
unspecified grounds for which unfairness must be proven.68 In the Hugo 
case Goldstone J further interpreted section 8(2) as follows:  
Each case, therefore, will require a careful and thorough understanding of the 
impact of the discriminatory action upon the particular people concerned to 
determine whether its overall impact is one which furthers the constitutional 
goal of equality or not.69 
What is important here is the process formulated. To decide whether 
discrimination is unfair, both the complainant group and nature of the 
interests affected must be considered.  
In the Harksen case the Constitutional Court developed this reasoning 
further. It created a two-stage test to determine whether there is unfair 
discrimination and thus a breach of the right to equality.70 In applying the 
test the first question is whether there is differentiation between people or 
categories of people. If so, it will be lawful only if rationally connected to a 
legitimate purpose.71 More specifically, to pass constitutional muster in 
terms of section 9(1), differentiation must not be arbitrary.72 Stage two of the 
test requires questioning whether differentiation amounts to unfair 
discrimination. This can be divided into two sub-enquiries: whether there is 
discrimination, and if so, whether it is unfair. If based on a class category 
specified in section 9(2) of the Constitution, there is automatically 
discrimination.73 If not, there is still discrimination where differentiation 
utilises characteristics with the potential to impair human dignity or 
otherwise affect persons adversely in a serious manner. 
At the second stage of the Harksen test discrimination is certainly unfair if it 
utilises one of the section 9(2) classifications. If not, unfairness depends on 
                                            
67  The Prinsloo case para 25. 
68  The Prinsloo case paras 27-28. 
69  The Hugo case para 43. 
70  The Harksen case para 54. 
71  The Harksen case para 54. Also see East Zulu Motors (Pty) Limited v 
Empangeni/Ngwezelane Transitional Local Council 1998 2 SA 61 (CC) para 24; and 
Jooste v Score Supermarket 1999 2 SA 1 (CC) para 17. 
72  The Harksen case paras 27-28. 
73  The prohibited discrimination categories listed in s 9(2) of the Constitution are: race, 
gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
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the impact of the discrimination on others in the same position as the person 
claiming the discrimination.74 On the assessment of impact, Goldstone J 
concluded that there is no closed list of factors. Therefore, relevant factors 
may emerge as the equality jurisprudence develops.75 As noted by Kruger, 
what needs to be kept in mind is the possibility of unfair indirect 
discrimination.76 This may result when "seemingly neutral provisions have 
a discriminatory effect (impact) on the complainants."77 Albertyn and 
Goldblatt have pointed out that applying the impact test to establish 
unfairness requires a contextual approach, noting particularly the effect on 
the dignity of the complainant.78 
The third and last stage of the Harksen test shifts attention to section 36 of 
the Constitution.79 This allows for the limitation of any right referred to in the 
Bill of Rights "to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in 
an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom."80 The section includes a list of some of the factors to be taken 
into account, including notably "the nature and extent of the limitation" and 
whether there are "less restrictive means to achieve the purpose" 
intended.81 Thus, even if it is established that a person has been unfairly 
discriminated against, it is still necessary to consider whether the person’s 
rights have been limited by such discrimination in a manner that is unlawful 
in terms of section 36. Although South African equality jurisprudence has 
developed considerably since the Harksen case, the test formulated in the 
latter continues to be utilised by our courts.82 
In applying the first stage of the Harksen test to a posthumously procreated 
child, if inheritance is denied there is undoubtedly differentiation between 
that child and one naturally conceived or implanted before the death of a 
testator, as the latter children are entitled to inherit, if necessary from the 
                                            
74  See Albertyn and Goldblatt 2006 http://www.chr.up.ac.za/chr_old/closa/chapters/ 
 Conference_Paper_on_the_Right_to_Equality.pdf 6. 
75  The Harksen case para 52. 
76  Kruger 2011 SALJ 490. 
77  Kruger 2011 SALJ 490. 
78  Albertyn and Goldblatt 2006 http://www.chr.up.ac.za/chr_old/closa/chapters/Confer 
ence_Paper_on_the_Right_to_Equality.pdf 7. 
79  The Harksen judgment actually referred to s 33 only, which was the then applicable 
limitations provision of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 
1993. This has since been replaced by s 36 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996. 
80  Section 36(1) of the Constitution. 
81  Sections 36(1)(c) and (e) of the Constitution. 
82  For the influence of the test and some subsequent cases see, for example, Smith 
2014 AHRLJ 614-629. 
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application of the nasciturus doctrine.83 It must then be asked whether the 
differentiation serves a legitimate purpose. It could be argued that a 
legitimate purpose is the avoidance of practical difficulties resulting from 
delays in the distribution of estates where posthumously procreated children 
are involved. However, it was held in the Australian case of K that this was 
insufficient justification for the resulting discrimination between classes of 
children.84 Therefore, it could possibly be argued similarly from a South 
African perspective that the practical difficulties of estate distribution do not 
constitute a sufficiently legitimate purpose for prohibiting inheritance. 
In moving to the application of the second stage of the Harksen test, 
differentiation involving posthumously procreated children results purely 
from the delay in the initiation of the life process. This is not one of the listed 
characteristics in section 9(2) of the Constitution. It is therefore necessary 
to decide whether there is discrimination, and if so, whether it is unfair, 
taking into account its impact on after-born children. This can be done by 
comparing posthumously procreated children to other children. They are the 
same in all respects except for the time of procreation. However, 
posthumously procreated children denied inheritance rights would begin life 
with materially less than others, purely because of the delay in the start of 
their lives, over which they have no control. The denial of the inheritances 
permitted to other children would undoubtedly have a discriminatory effect. 
In Canada there have been concerns that the complete denial of inheritance 
for all posthumously procreated children constitutes unfair discrimination 
contravening the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.85 It could be 
contended similarly that it contravenes section 9(2) of the South African 
Constitution. The impact is sufficiently serious to infringe dignity. So, 
arguably, the second stage of the Harksen test is met. 
It will be remembered that the third stage of the test is the section 36 
limitations enquiry. With this it is necessary to consider whether the denial 
of inheritance for posthumously procreated children is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom. It is submitted that the answer to this must be 
negative. Admittedly, a practical argument supporting the denial of 
inheritances is administrative difficulties. An executor would have to ensure 
that all surviving gametes are either implanted or destroyed before 
                                            
83  See Heaton South African Law of Persons 12-13. 
84  The K case paras 28-29. On this case see further part 3.1 above. 
85  Alberta Law Reform Institute Assisted Reproduction after Death para 43. The 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is incorporated as a bill of rights in part 1 
of the Canadian Constitution Act, 1982. 
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distributing an estate, which could take many years.86 However, this must 
be weighed against the core constitutional values of equality and dignity, 
which are of the utmost importance in our democracy. In such a balance, 
denying a group of individuals benefits, because of the timing of their 
procreation might well be unfair. Applying two of the criteria in section 36(1), 
it should firstly be noted that the denial of any inheritance to all 
posthumously procreated children would be an extensive limitation. In terms 
of section 36(1)(c); the more extensive a limitation, the less likely it is to pass 
constitutional muster. Secondly, as noted above, section 36(1)(e) requires 
a consideration of whether other means can achieve the purpose of the 
discrimination in question. As will be discussed below, it is possible through 
the imposition of appropriate legislative conditions to substantially address 
the practical difficulties in winding up estates, which are the basis of the 
administrative argument against inheritance by posthumously procreated 
children.87 
It may be concluded that an equality argument supporting inheritance rights 
for posthumously procreated children could possibly be made. This is 
supported by the Constitutional Court's directive in H v Fetal Assessment 
Centre. As noted above, this required courts to take more account of pre-
birth events when considering claims brought on behalf of children.88 
5.3 Scope for a best interests argument 
As an alternative to an equality and anti-discrimination claim it could be 
contended that it is against the best interests of posthumously procreated 
children to deny them inheritance benefits. Being party to both the 1989 UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) and the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990), South Africa is legally obliged to 
uphold the best interests of children.89 This is reinforced by section 28 of the 
Constitution, which is dedicated specifically to children's rights. In particular, 
it is stated in section 28(2) that "[a] child's best interests are of paramount 
importance in every matter concerning the child." 
                                            
86  See part 2 above. 
87  See part 6 below. 
88  See part 5.1 above. 
89  Article 2 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) prohibits 
discrimination against children, and art 3 requires that children's best interests "shall 
be a primary consideration". Art 3 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare 
of the Child (1990) prohibits discrimination against children and art 4 requires that 
the best interests of children "shall be the primary consideration" in all actions 
concerning them. 
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In view of the high standing in the Constitution of children's best interests 
as being paramount a best interests argument is potentially the strongest 
one for motivating benefits for posthumously procreated children. 
Furthermore, it has been claimed that in many other jurisdictions best 
interests of the child arguments on behalf of such children are beginning to 
receive more weight, as against administrative convenience in winding up 
estates.90 However, there are some difficulties. Firstly, best interests' 
contentions would be two-sided in any case where there are other child 
beneficiaries who would have their inheritance shares delayed and 
diminished by that of a posthumously procreated child. Secondly, in the 
Christian Lawyers case the High Court reasoned that if the drafters of the 
Constitution had intended to protect an unborn child, this would have been 
stated expressly in section 28.91 It reasoned that in terms of that section age 
begins at birth, which therefore excludes a foetus.92 The court considered 
that if the Constitution were interpreted as affording a foetus rights, far-
reaching consequences would ensue, which the drafters of the Constitution 
could not have contemplated without expressing themselves in no uncertain 
terms.93 Pickles has pointed out that the court took something of a leap in 
holding that section 28 applies only to children already born. She contends 
that this presumption was based mainly on a view that many rights provided 
in section 28 are relevant only to children already born.94 However, the 
ruling stands as a barrier to best interests' contentions on behalf of 
posthumously procreated children. 
It is true that the Constitutional Court signalled in H v Fetal Assessment 
Centre that the courts need to change their approach and be more willing 
to consider pre-birth circumstances as potentially relevant to the best 
interests of children.95 However, even where courts may be more open to 
this in the future, it must be remembered that children's best interests, 
although paramount, are not absolute. It was held by the Constitutional 
Court per Sachs J in S v M that the welfare principle as formulated in section 
28(2), whilst of crucial importance, is capable of limitation and thus does not 
necessarily always trump every other consideration.96 Moyo has pointed out 
                                            
90  Alberta Law Reform Institute Succession and Posthumously Conceived Children 
para 89. 
91  The Christian Lawyers case 1121. 
92  The Christian Lawyers case 1122. 
93  The Christian Lawyers case 1124. 
94  Pickles 2012 PELJ 416. 
95  H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 2 SA 193 (CC) para 52. 
96  S v M 2008 3 SA 232 (CC) paras 25-26. 
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that this ruling significantly reduces the power of best interests' arguments.97 
In situations of posthumously procreated children seeking inheritances it 
might be contended that their best interests should on the authority of S v 
M be trumped by those of other child beneficiaries or by the additional 
complications in winding up the estate. It must then be concluded that the 
outcome of a claim based on best interests appears unpredictable in South 
African law, as presently developed. 
6  Conclusion 
Medical technology has developed to the point where many persons can 
now realistically consider the option of freezing and preserving their 
gametes for the future procreation of a child. Where couples do this or an 
unknown donor is available there is the even the possibility of cryogenically 
storing embryos which are already fertilised. As cryogenic technology 
becomes well-known and widely available, it is foreseeable that increasing 
numbers of children will be artificially procreated by means of processes 
initiated after the death of at least one parent. This will inevitably lead to 
inheritance claims by such children. 
Our investigation of possible coverage concerning such claims in current 
South African law has revealed more questions than answers. Regarding 
intestate succession claims by posthumously procreated children, the 
Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 provides no answers at all. With testate 
succession, the Wills Act also provides no specific coverage. Although there 
are unlikely to be difficulties where valid wills clearly cover the possibility of 
posthumously procreated heirs, it is uncertain how the Wills Act would be 
interpreted where child beneficiaries are referred to as a general class. By 
introducing conception as a gateway requirement in such situations, section 
2D(1)(c) of the Act simply raises the question of what precisely is meant by 
conception where artificial reproduction techniques have been utilised. 
Not surprisingly, in view of its much earlier origins, the common law is of 
little assistance in making up for the shortcomings of South African 
succession legislation. The common law rule that legal personality is 
awarded only at birth renders it uncertain whether courts would use their 
power as the upper guardians of all minors to support inheritance claims 
brought on behalf of posthumously procreated children. Also, just as with 
                                            
97  Moyo 2012 AHRLJ 169. 
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the Wills Act, the nasciturus doctrine's requirement of conception as a sine 
qua non complicates and severely limits its application to such children. 
Unfortunately, the Constitution does little to resolve uncertainties about the 
application of South African succession legislation and the common law. 
High Court holdings in the Christian Lawyers case and H v Kingsbury Foetal 
Assessment Centre that constitutional rights are subject to legal 
personality’s beginning only at birth are admittedly rendered questionable 
by the Constitutional Court's undeveloped directive in H v Fetal Assessment 
Centre that courts may consider pre-birth circumstances.98 That directive 
could arguably support a best interests' argument on behalf of 
posthumously procreated children. However, the Constitutional Court's 
earlier ruling in S v M that best interest arguments can be trumped, and the 
possibility that there may be contrary best interests of other child 
beneficiaries, leave the outcome of claims based on section 28(2) of the 
Constitution uncertain.99  
Equality claims based on section 9 of the Constitution are probably the best 
currently available option in building a case for inheritance by posthumously 
procreated children. As has been shown, it is relatively easy to prove unfair 
discrimination by utilising the Harksen case test. However, in opposition to 
such claims, a section 36 limitations contention based on the alleged 
impracticality of the disbursement of estates for unpredictably long periods 
of time could be put forward. A second opposing argument could be based 
on the limited applicability of the Constitution to pre-birth circumstances.100 
Our analysis of existing South African law has thus shown that there are 
ambiguities and uncertainties regarding the application of succession 
legislation, the common law and the Constitution on behalf of posthumously 
procreated children seeking inheritance benefits. There is thus a real danger 
of the emergence in South Africa of what Zago referred to as a group of 
second-class children denied inheritance rights.101 As noted by Atherton, to 
deny posthumously procreated children is to place them in the same 
position occupied for centuries by so-called illegitimate children, who were 
not permitted to inherit from their fathers and paternal relatives.102 Children 
have no control over how or when they are born, and therefore it is 
                                            
98  These three cases are discussed in part 5.1 above. 
99  Further uncertainty is introduced by the holding in the Christian Lawyers case that s 
28 is not applicable to unborn children: see part 5.3 above. 
100  See the Christian Lawyers case as referred to in part 5.3 above. 
101  Zago 2014 http://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/609 1 as cited in part 1 
above. 
102  Atherton 1999 Leg Stud 161. 
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necessary to limit differentiation against them as much as possible. Children 
should not face succession rights discrimination merely because they were 
procreated differently. In view of this, we recommend that clarifying 
legislation governing their inheritance eligibility needs to be promulgated. 
Commentators in other jurisdictions have contended that such legislation is 
essential, given the increasing availability of artificial procreation 
services.103 In 2012 the Alberta Law Reform Institute concluded very 
similarly that because of the novel questions raised by inheritance claims 
by posthumously procreated children, legislation is essential.104 
It might be counter-argued that reliance should rather be placed on courts 
to develop South African law in an ad hoc manner as the need arises. 
Specifically, it might be contended that courts should use their power to 
develop the common law in accordance with the spirit, purport and objects 
of the Bill of Rights as directed in section 39(2) of the Constitution. However, 
Walters has pointed out that in many jurisdictions even where courts have 
been prepared to interpret traditional remedies in a progressive manner on 
behalf of posthumously procreated children, this has resulted in widely 
differing solutions that often fail to provide protection.105 If this is left to the 
courts, uniform results are unlikely to be produced.106 Reviews of case law 
in some jurisdictions support this contention, noting that courts are not 
consistent in such decisions.107 In some jurisdictions the judges themselves 
have warned that such problems are too difficult for courts alone to solve, 
without at least some legislative guidance.108 If such legislation is 
developed, aside from assisting courts it will also make it easier for couples 
to plan how to utilise artificial procreation services.109 
The primary purposes of this article have been to demonstrate the 
inadequacy of existing South African law and to motivate for legislation to 
address this. For reasons of space it is not possible to discuss in detail 
                                            
103  See, for example, Diamond 1998 NY Int'l L Rev 99; Gary 2005 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/probate_property_magaz
ine 35; Peebles 2013 Mo L Rev 515; Walters 2014 Val U L Rev 1267-1268; 
Thomasson 2013-2014 Denv U L Rev 738-739; and Croucher 2017 Trusts and 
Trustees 74-75. 
104  Alberta Law Reform Institute Succession and Posthumously Conceived Children 
para 88. 
105  Walters 2014 Val U L Rev 1267. 
106  Alberta Law Reform Institute Succession and Posthumously Conceived Children 
para 88. 
107  Black and Therriault 2010-2011 Est Tr & Pensions J 156. 
108  See Diamond 1998 NY Int'l L Rev 91-92; Peebles 2013 Mo L Rev 509; Walters 2014 
Val U L Rev 1268; and Croucher 2017 Trusts and Trustees 79. 
109  On the advantages of legislation also see Doucet 2013 Dalhousie J Legal Stud 20. 
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possibilities for the wording of the proposed legislation. What can be 
suggested, however, is that section 2D(1)(c) of the Wills Act be 
supplemented to indicate that, with reference to artificially procreated 
children, conception means fertilisation in the sense of successfully 
conjoining an egg and sperm, even if this occurs in vitro. Concerning 
additional legislative provisions, it is important to point out that the major 
objection to claims by posthumously procreated children, namely, 
uncertainty and delay in the winding up of estates, can be addressed. 
Standard provisions in jurisdictions which have legislation combine a notice 
requirement and a final deadline.110 Typically, notice of intention to give birth 
to a posthumously procreated child must be given to an executor within a 
short period such as six months after the death of the testator.111 If a child 
is then born within a further deadline period, which is typically between two 
and three years, the child will receive an inheritance.112 Pending the 
possibility of birth, the executor keeps an appropriate share of the estate in 
trust. In the meanwhile, the other heirs receive proportional shares of the 
estate without having to wait. If a child is not born by the final deadline, the 
withheld portion is disbursed to the other heirs.113 A postponement of the 
complete division of estates pending the birth of a child is nothing new in 
South African law. As pointed out by Boezaart, it has become standard 
procedure for executors to delay the disbursement of inheritances where 
the pregnancy of a mother indicates that there may in the future be an 
additional beneficiary.114 Legislatively formalising this procedure on behalf 
of posthumously procreated children as suggested would greatly reduce the 
potential for discrimination against them. It would also bring South African 
law more in line with modern medical developments. 
                                            
110  Walters 2014 Val U L Rev 1267. 
111  For example, s 8.1 of the British Columbia Wills, Estates and Succession Act, 2009 
as amended in 2011 allows six months. Also see Wood 2010 Ga L Rev 907. 
112  For example, s 1.1 of the Ontario Succession Law Reform Act, 1990 as inserted on 
1 January 2017 sets a deadline of three years. A period of two years is permitted by 
s 249.5 of the California Probate Code. Also see Thomasson 2013-2014 Denv U L 
Rev 739; and Wood 2010 Ga L Rev 906. 
113  Walters 2014 Val U L Rev 1267. 
114  Boezaart "Child Law" 6-7. 
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